
# A brief intro to social dilemmas ... and how bacteria and humans solve them


Juan F Poyatos Logic of Genomics Systems Laboratory (CNB-CSIC)

Master in Biophysics 2012/2013 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Madrid, Spain Feb 25-27, 2013


### Multilevel cooperation



### Migration and differential fitness; synthetic design



#### The not-so-easy-to-test Hamilton's rule



0.2


0.4

0.6


inital (p) and final (p'= $p+\Delta p$ ) global producer proportions

8.0


### Controlling the growth difference between Ps and nPs



### High variability of cheater frequency between groups





#### Facultative cheating in yeast




By limiting the histidine in the media we can impose a cost on the cooperator strain because it is a histidine auxotroph


### Cells grow faster at high density








### Cheaters and cooperator can invade each other




# Equilibrium fraction of cooperators and growth decrease as cost of cooperation increases (by reducing [histidine])




Coexistence C and D

### It is a 'snow-drift' game! Coexistence C and D



But the linear 'sucrose game' does not lead to coexistence ...




Payoff<sub>C</sub> = 
$$\epsilon$$
 + f (1- $\epsilon$ ) -c

Payoff<sub>D</sub> = f (1- $\epsilon$ )


ε<c → Defectors invade ε>c → Cooperators invade

#### One needs non-linear benefits!




Payoff<sub>D</sub> = 
$$f(1-\epsilon) \rightarrow Payoff_D = [f(1-\epsilon)]^{\alpha}$$


### Glucose changes it all!






## Swarming; a collective form of surface motility resting on a PG







LoGS lab

# *rhlA* can use the secretions of others to swarm yet has no measurable competitive advantage!?






Bio-surfactants are only produced when the cells are not dividing, due to *nitrogen limitation*, and use carbon source that under these circumstances cannot be use for growth



# Bio-surfactant secretion becomes exploitable in a inducible strain lacking the native regulation





wt (green) vs. rhlA (red)




Inducible strain (green; *rhlA*<sup>-</sup> P<sub>BAD</sub>*rhlAB*) vs. *rhlA*<sup>-</sup> (red)


### Cells tend to redirect the non-limiting carbon flux






### Plasticity as ecological rationality






### Cheater invasions can lead to recovery



### Different heuristics associated to different environments




#### Are people conditionally cooperative?

people who are willing to contribute more to a public good the more others contribute

### Experiment

- 4 individuals deciding how to spend 20 tokens into a socalled 'project'
- Two classes of decision 1)unconditional or 2)conditional contribution (for each average contribution how much am I willing to contribute?)
- Experiment played once
- -1 out of 4 chosen to use decision class 2) based on unconditional decisions (class 1) of the other 3.

### The decline of cooperation




### Are people using <u>heuristics</u>?

We consider two systems of reasoning (dual-process framework)

- <u>System 1</u>: fast, intuitive, heuristic-based, parallel processing, 'cheap'
- <u>System 2</u>: slow, reflexive, associative-based, serial processing, costly


How would these two systems influence cooperative decision-making?

### Faster decisions are more cooperative




One-shot public good games with groups of 4 participants

### Faster decisions are more cooperative



Inducing intuitive thinking promotes cooperation

### Faster decisions are more cooperative



Priming modifies cooperation

It might be better for cooperation if we split in groups

Don't share all your public goods, keep a bit for yourself!

When in need ... move!

This was not the most optimal decision but it sure was the most ecologically rational

Don't think ... and cooperate!